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or safety. That a trier of fact may infer
knowledge from the obvious, in other
words, does not mean that it must do so.
Prison officials charged with deliberate
indifference might show, for example,
that they did not know of the underlying
facts indicating a sufficiently substantial
danger and that they were therefore
unaware of a danger, or that they knew
the underlying facts but believed (albeit
unsoundly) that the risk to which the
facts gave rise was insubstantial or
nonexistent.” This is the whole quote.
Farmer was remanded for factual
development. The Supreme Court
rejected a request to affirm for other
reasons. 511 U.S. at 848-51. Here,
the Tenth Circuit not only failed to
give Rios the favorable inference she
was due; it affirmatively gave it to the
moving parties.
It is a shame that the Tenth Circuit
dodged the Bivens question, because
Colorado courts will continue to
dismiss cases brought by battered and
sexually assaulted LGBT prisoners and
others. Kansas’ notorious Leavenworth
penitentiary is in the Tenth Circuit. The
better resolution of Bivens/Ziglar is
found in the Third Circuit’s decision in
Bistrian v. Levy, 912 F.3d 79, 88 (3d Cir.
2018) (“Prisoner-on-prisoner violence is
not a new context for Bivens claims.”)
Rios was represented by the
McArthur Justice Center (Washington,
DC). There were two amicus briefs filed
in support of Ms. Rios: one from a group
of correctional officials filed by Harvard
Law School; and one from a consortium
of advocates that included Black &
Pink National, Center for Constitutional
Rights, Dee Farmer, GLBTQ Legal
Advocates and Defenders, Justice
Detention
International,
Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Muslim Alliance for Sexual and Gender
Diversity, National Center for Lesbian
Rights, National Center for Transgender
Equality, Transgender Law Center,
and Transgender Legal Defense &
Education Fund. ■
William J. Rold is a civil rights
attorney in New York City and a former
judge. He previously represented the
American Bar Association on the
National Commission for Correctional
Health Care.
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10th Circuit Panel Finds WellDocumented Persecution of
Transgender Women in Honduras,
Reversing Board of Immigration
Appeals in Asylum Case
By Arthur S. Leonard
Reversing the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and an Immigration
Judge (IJ), a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals voted 2-1 in Gonzalez Aguilar
v. Garland, 2022 WL 905384, 2022 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8183 (March 29, 2022),
found that “any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to find a pattern
or practice of persecution against
transgender women in Honduras.”
Holding by implication that the IJ
and the BIA were “unreasonable”
adjudicators in this case, the opinion
by Circuit Judge Robert E. Bacharach
scored the agency for ignoring evidence
of de facto conditions and mistakenly
exalting ineffective efforts by the
Honduran government to deal with
misbehaving law enforcement officers
and a deeply transphobic population.
The petitioner, identified as male
at birth, “displayed many feminine
qualities” from an early age, which
created “tensions at home.” The
petitioner’s mother left for Mexico and
the youngster and his two siblings (a
brother and a sister) went to live with
an uncle, who turned out to be brutish
and deeply transphobic. He beat the
petitioner and the petitioner’s siblings.
When petitioner was twelve, he and
his sister fled to Mexico hoping to
locate their mother, but they “suffered
further abuse in Mexico, leading them
to flee again – this time for the United
States,” where petitioner assumed a
feminine name, obtained hormone
therapy, and wore female cloths. When
the government brought removal
proceedings against petitioner, she
sought asylum, withholding of removal
and deferral of removal, explaining at
her hearing “her fear of returning to
Honduras, describing life there as ‘very
difficult’ for transgender women.” The IJ

found her testimony credible but denied
asylum, withholding and deferral, and
on appeal one member of the BIA
issued a brief dismissal order with no
discussion or analysis. Specifically, as to
asylum, the Board rejected petitioner’s
claims of past persecution and a fear of
future persecution.
Turning first to past persecution, the
IJ had concluded that since the uncle was
abusive not only to petitioner but also to
his sister and brother, and this was the
only physical abuse cited by petitioner,
the petitioner had failed to prove past
persecution on account of her gender
identity. Apparently, the IJ embraced
the “equal opportunity abuser” theory
that will be familiar to those acquainted
with “hostile work environment” case
law under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. This comes up most often
with abusive bosses who are mean and
nasty to everybody, regardless of race
or color, religion, sex, or national origin.
In such cases many courts rejected
Title VII hostile environment claims,
because the mistreatment of the plaintiff
was not primarily due to their race or
color, religion, sex or national origin,
and thus was not “discriminatory” in
a way that violates the statute. Same
here. The Board upheld the IJ’s finding
that any persecution suffered at home
by petitioner was not due to her gender
identity. “This finding was supported
by substantial evidence,” wrote Judge
Bacharach. “[Petitioner] points to
evidence of the uncle’s slurs and threats,
attributing his violence to disgust with
[petitioner]’s feminine behavior. But
other evidence suggested that the uncle
would have abused [petitioner] anyway;
the uncle abused not just [petitioner]
but also her sister and brother, the uncle
often resorted to violence when drunk,

and the uncle became increasingly
violent when he stopped getting money
for [petitioner]’s care. A reasonable
adjudicator could thus regard gender
identity as subordinate or incidental to
the uncle’s other reasons for beating
[petitioner]. So, we conclude that the
Board had substantial evidence to reject
[petitioner]’s claim of past persecution
based on the uncle’s abuse.” The court
also found that allegations first raised on
appeal about [petitioner] being expelled
from school for “refusing to cut her hair
or wear male clothing” and after being
called “gay” by classmates, could not
be the basis for a persecution finding.
“[Petitioner]
never
characterized
the denial of educational access as
persecution,” wrote Bacharach, “so
these two references did not present
a distinct theory of past persecution
involving the denial of education.” (Not
surprisingly, the dissent concurred in
this part of the opinion.)
However, the majority of the panel
found that the BIA and IJ erred by
finding that [petitioner] failed to show
a pattern or practice of persecution
against transgender adults in Honduras.
Here, State Department Country
Reports published during the Obama
Administration
provided
detailed
analysis, with statistics, on the basis
of which the court found that any
“reasonable adjudicator” would be
compelled to find a pattern or practice
of persecution of transgender women in
Honduras. The IJ and the Board were
apparently seduced by the government’s
argument that meetings between
LGBT community representatives
and government officials, some
legal developments (hate crime and
antidiscrimination statutes), and some
prosecutions of people for anti-LGBT
violence, were sufficient to show
there was not a pattern or practice of
persecution. Stating disagreement with
the BIA’s conclusion affirming the IJ,
the court said, “The acts of violence
are so widespread that any reasonable
adjudicator would find a pattern
or practice of persecution against
transgender women in Honduras,”
going on to cite chapter and verse from
the 2015 and 2016 Country Reports.
(Note well the dates. Once the Trump

Administration came in starting in 2017,
State Department annual country by
country human rights reports required
by statute became increasing unhelpful
for LGBQ refugees seeking to prove a
pattern or practice of persecution in
their home country. Documenting such
things was apparently not a priority for
the State Department under Trump.)
The court pointed out that although
at the high government level there may
have been some attempt to deal with
the problem, what counts is whether
the problem continued to exist. In
sections of the opinion headed “Antidiscrimination laws in Honduras are
ineffective in curbing the pervasive
persecution of transgender women” and
“The Honduran government does not
effectively prosecute crimes committed
against transgender women,” the
opinion summarizes the extensive
documentation presented in the record.
The IJ, the BIA, and the dissent are
ready to make much about a relative
handful of prosecutions, some of which
were successful, but “overlooking” what
a small percentage they were of all
enumerated cases of violence against
transgender women. Particularly telling
from the 2015 Country Report is a
paragraph, quoted by Judge Bacharach,
pointing out that security forces and
other officials were implicated in the
violence, and “the poor functioning
of the justice system contributed to
widespread impunity” (emphasis added
by the court).
“Indeed,”
continued
Judge
Bacharach, “the record overwhelmingly
shows that law-enforcement officers are
frequently the perpetrators of violence
against transgender women,” citing an
expert declaration accepted in evidence
by the IJ. The court also pointed out the
basic irrelevance to the question before
it – asylum and evidence of a pattern of
persecution – of cases cited and relied
upon by the dissent, all of which the court
found to be relevantly distinguishable,
reiterating again that “the record as
a whole would have compelled any
reasonable adjudicator to find a pattern
or practice of persecution against
transgender women in Honduras.”
Petitioner had applied for asylum and
withholding or deferral of removal. “The

Board rejected these applications based
solely on [petitioner]’s ineligibility for
asylum,” wrote Bacharach. “But we
conclude that [petitioner] is eligible for
asylum. So we remand for the Board
to reconsider not only the availability
of asylum, but also the potential
availability of withholding of removal
and deferral of removal.”
Judge Joel M. Carson, II, dissenting,
insisted that the result found by the
majority was not compelled by the
record as to pattern or practice of
persecution.
“Congress
mandates
that we reverse factual findings only
when evidence is so compelling that
no reasonable factfinder could find
as the BIA did – a high bar indeed.
In my opinion, the evidence is not so
compelling. The perhaps unintended
result of the majority opinion is a policy
victory for certain asylum seekers.
But in my opinion, one we should not
award. That responsibility lies with the
other branches of government.” But he
prefaces this statement by admitting
that “no one can question the suffering
[Petitioner] has experienced over the
course of her life. Her tragic story evokes
sympathy for her plight and, while I
might decide this case differently than
the immigration judge or the BIA, my
de novo review of this petition matters
not.”
Judge Carson concluded that the
various legislative initiatives undertaken
by the Honduran government were
“something a reasonable jurist could
hang her hat on to find that Petitioner
does not have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” He suggests that the
majority “disregards portions of the
State Department’s Country Report
to suggest the Honduran government
is unwilling or unable to protect its
citizens.” Yes, indeed, for which it has
a poor reputation through the Americas!
And he cites decisions from other
circuits that have rejected pattern or
practice claims from other countries
based on evidence of formalities such
as the passage of laws against hate
crimes or discrimination. “Given that
other reasonable jurists throughout
the country have affirmed similar
BIA decisions with similar evidence
in the record,” he asks, “how does the
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majority reach a different result? First,
the majority reweighs the evidence,
and second, it disregards portions of
the State Department’s Country Report
to suggest the Honduran government
is unwilling or unable to protect its
citizens.” Sweeping generalizations!!
Perhaps it is not surprising that the
two judges in the majority, Robert E.
Bacharach and Gregory A. Phillips,
were appointed by President Barack
Obama, or that dissenter Joel Carson was
appointed by Donald J. Trump. Unlike
most typical court of appeals asylum
cases that are not officially published in
full text, being shunted to Fed. App’x or
listed in tables as summary dispositions,
this opinion has been submitted to
F.4th for official publication. One likely
explanation for this is that unlike many
cases in which petitioners are pro se or
struggling with underfunded pro bono
counsel, this petitioner had a highpower legal team pitching for her. The
Petitioner is represented by Nicole
Henning, of Jones Day, Chicago (Dennis
D’Aquila, of Jones Day, and Keren
Zwick and Tania Linares Garcia of the
National Immigration Justice Center,
with her on the brief). They evidently
did an excellent job in building a record
and presenting it effectively to the court
of appeals. An en banc suggestion by
Carson or the government is unlikely
to be successful. Of the eleven active
judges in the circuit, five were appointed
by Obama and one by President Joe
Biden, making up a majority of active
judges. Three were appointed by George
W. Bush and two by Donald J. Trump.
There is one vacancy. ■
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9th Circuit Panel Affirms Arizona
District Court’s Denial of a Preliminary
Injunction Against the State’s
Categorical Medicaid Exclusion for
Gender Confirmation Surgeries
By Joseph Hayes Rochman
On March 10, 2022, a three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit affirmed the District
of Arizona’s ruling denying the
plaintiffs’—two transgender teenagers—
motion for preliminary injunction
seeking to remove the Arizona Medicaid
agency’s categorical exclusion for gender
affirming surgeries. Doe v. Snyder, 28
F.4th 103 (9th Cir. 2022). The plaintiffs
sought an individualized assessment
from their Medicaid provider. Although
the panel opinion by Judge Consuelo
María Callahan denied the plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction, the
court found that District Court Judge
Scott H. Rash clearly erred by reading
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731 (2020) too narrowly to only cover
Title VII claims.
John Doe and D.H. filed their classaction lawsuit On August 6, 2020, in the
District of Arizona challenging Arizona
Medicaid’s categorical exclusion for
medically necessary surgeries for
transgender patients as treatment
for their gender dysphoria. Doe and
D.H. receive health coverage through
Medicaid and sought an individualized
assessment from AHCCCS to determine
whether their male chest reconstructive
surgery, also called gender-affirming
mastectomy, top surgery, or chest
masculinization, would be covered.
According to the plaintiffs’ filings,
AHCCCS covers medically necessary
mastectomies
and
reconstruction
services for women. According to the
complaint, AHCCCS has prohibited
coverage for “gender reassignment
surgeries” since 1982.
Doe and D.H. claimed violations of
the Medicaid Act, Section 1557 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA), and the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. Judge

Rash denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction in March 2021 in
Hennessy-Waller v. Snyder, 529 F. Supp.
3d 1031 (D. Ariz. 2021). D.H. withdrew
from the case on appeal and the court
only addressed an injunction for Doe.
The appeal was also limited to Section
1557 and the Equal Protection Clause
and did not challenge the district court’s
ruling on the Medicaid Act.
The primary question on Doe’s
appeal was whether the preliminary
injunction Doe sought was a prohibitory
injunction or a mandatory injunction.
Generally speaking, a mandatory
injunction, which comes with a higher
standard of review, seeks to compel a
party to act and “change the status quo.”
In contrast, a prohibitory injunction
typically seeks to maintain the status
quo to prevent an injury from occurring.
There was some dispute whether Doe
and D.H. sought to compel coverage
for the surgeries, or whether they were
seeking an individualized assessment
with the ultimate relief being coverage
for their surgeries. Judge Rash rejected
Doe’s argument they were seeking a
prohibitory injunction. Instead, Judge
Rash agreed with AHCCCS that Doe
and D.H. sought mandatory injunctive
relief.
On appeal, Doe contended in his
opening brief that Judge Rash erred
in deciding they sought a mandatory
injunction. Doe contended he did not
seek to “compel AHCCCS to take a
particular action.” On the contrary,
Doe argued, he merely sought for
AHCCCS “to cease enforcing their
unlawful exclusion and follow their
ordinary practice for other Medicaid
services.” He only asked that AHCCCS
gave him an individualized assessment
to evaluate their insurance coverage
without the discriminatory categorical

